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THE NEW NEW SECULARISM AND THE END OF THE
LAW OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
BRUCE LEDEWITZt
"There should
1
religion."

..

be a service designed for those without a

INTRODUCTION
There is a general feeling today among American legal
thinkers that the constitutional principle of separation of church2
and state is not enforceable, at least not to the extent it used to be.
A five-Justice majority on the United States Supreme Court stands
poised to overturn, formally or informally, the vaunted Lemon test
and replace it with some sort of permissive formulation that will
allow a substantial amount of religious symbolism in the public
square, as well as public support for various kinds of religious
institutions. Indeed, the Court's acceptance of large-scale vouchers
for private secondary schools in 20023 and its reinstatement of the
phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance in 20044 might be
said to have already ushered in this new era. At the same time,
there is a growing hope on the part of some individuals, sparked by
new social science research showing a rapid increase in secularization in the United States, that the resurgence of religious influence
in constitutional doctrine might be short-lived, and that separation
of church and state might be reinstated in the future.
This air of back and forth is perfectly captured by Steven
Gey in his recent article, "Life After the Establishment Clause.
Professor Gey writes of a new "anti-separationist majority" on the
Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
lP.D. JAMES, ORIGINAL SIN 69 (1994).
2 See, e.g., Susan Gelman & Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal
ProtectionClausefor Religion Cases (Not Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 701-02 (2008).

3 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
4 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
5 Steven G. Gey, Life After the Establishment Clause, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1
(2007).
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Court, whose short-run efforts toward integration of church and
state will result in "inevitable failure," 6 both because religious
integration is inconsistent with America's basic traditions and
because of demographic changes occurring in the public's religious
and spiritual commitments. 7
The reference in the title of this article to "the End of the
Law of Separation of Church and State" might seem to echo the
view that religious believers are on the verge of capturing constitutional law in order to obliterate the wall of separation between
church and state. The reference to the "New Secularism" might be
thought to hail sociological changes as eventually reversing that
religious tide.
However, this article adopts a quite different view of recent
changes in legal doctrine and the influence of secularism. It is true
that the United States Supreme Court is not currently enforcing a
strict separation of church and state, and will probably not do so
for the foreseeable future. It is also true that America is rapidly
secularizing and religiously fragmenting, and that these changes
must inevitably affect Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
What has not yet been recognized by American legal
thinkers, however, is that secularism is changing as it grows. There
are new secular writers, referred to here as the "new new
secularists," who are adopting a nuanced and somewhat accepting
attitude regarding religion. As a result, a public role for religious
language, imagery, and symbols, as well as public subsidies for
institutions closely linked to religion, might be accepted by at least
some secularists in the future as supportive of a healthy and
flourishing mixed national culture of religious believers and
nonbelievers. In the future, there might be secular support for
6 Id. at 3, 42.

7Although I refer to Professor Gey's article here as a kind of exemplar of recent,
pro-separation thought in legal academia, the fear that the Court is poised to

make a change in Establishment Clause doctrine toward a preference for religion
is widespread in the legal academy. See, e.g., Kelly S. Terry, Shifting Out of
Neutral: Intelligent Design and the Road to Nonpreferentialism, 18 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 67 (2008).
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policies that now spark a legal tug of war among majority religious
believers, minority religious believers and nonbelievers.
If a future like this were to come to pass, it would presage
the end of the law of separation of church and state, not in the
sense that current law would be overturned in favor of religion,
which is the fear of Professor Gey, but in the sense that the current
doctrinal starting point of opposition between the religious
majority, on one hand, and the nonreligious and minority religious
believers, on the other, would be overturned. It is possible that, in
the not-too-distant future, nonbelievers and minority believers, as
well as the religious majority, will come to see areas of common
interest in what might be called the constitutional law of public
expression of shared meaning. While I would not say that such a
future is inevitable, I hope to convince the reader that such a future
is possible, and that it would be preferable to the endless contest
between opposing sides that the culture wars have so far promoted
in America.
I.

THE CURRENT CHALLENGE TO
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

It is not surprising that a change is expected in the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause 8 of the First
Amendment. Although the word neutrality has many different
interpretations, as has most convincingly been shown by Douglas
Laycock, 9 and although the very notion of government neutrality
toward religion has been dismissed as impossible, 10 Establishment
Clause doctrine has promised government neutrality toward
religion for quite a long time. Now, it appears, there is no longer a
8 U.S.

CONST.

amend.

I ("Congress

establishment of religion . .

. ."). The

shall make

no

law respecting

an

second religion clause, "or prohibiting the

free exercise thereof," is referred to as the Free Exercise Clause. Id.
9 See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and DisaggregatedNeutrality
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993 (1990).
10 See, e.g., FRANK S. RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES 49 (2007).
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majority on the Supreme Court dedicated to the concept of
government neutrality toward religion as the foundation of the
meaning of the Establishment Clause.
The first post-WWII case to interpret the Establishment
1 Justice Hugo Black's
Clause was Everson v. Board of Education."
majority opinion in Everson attempted to give an overall formulation of the meaning of the Establishment Clause, and concluded
with Thomas Jefferson's metaphor of the wall of separation
between church and State. 12 Undoubtedly, most Americans tend to
think of separation of church and state when considering Establishment Clause issues, whether they agree or disagree with the
Court's interpretations.
However, Justice Black was not really thinking of separation in concluding that the government could pay for transportation
of schoolchildren to both public and parochial schools, which was
the actual outcome of the case. Justice Black held that the State
had only to offer its services equally to believers and nonbelievers
in order to satisfy the Establishment Clause. The opinion referred
to this equality principle as neutrality. This principle, as enunciated
by Justice Black in Everson, is as follows: "[The Establishment
Clause] requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups
of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the
state to be their adversary."' 13 The Court has referred consistently
to neutrality as the foundation of Establishment Clause jurisprudence since Everson.
This concept of neutrality seemed intended by Justice
Black to keep the state clear of all promotion of religion. Under the
Establishment Clause jurisprudence of Justice Black's time, the
states and the federal government were prohibited from passing
laws that "aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
" 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
12 See id. at 16 ("In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of

religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and
State."') (internal citations omitted).
13Id. at 18.
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over another." 14 Certainly Justice Black did not acknowledge any
tension between the idea of government neutrality toward religion
and the government's non-preference for religion over irreligion.
The closest the Court has come to declaring an Establishment Clause test since Everson is the three-part formulation
enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971,5 known as the "Lemon

test." Similar to the neutrality principle discussed above, this test
seems to prohibit the government from preferring religion over
irreligion: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion."' 6 In
recent years, this test has been criticized by several Justices, and it
is not always used. However, it has never been overruled.
In 1984, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor interpreted the
Lemon test in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly17 to
prohibit government endorsement of religion: "The purpose prong
of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to
endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether,
irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under
review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.
An affirmative answer to either question should render the
challenged practice invalid."' 18 This formulation was approvingly
cited by Justice John Stevens' majority opinion in Wallace v.
Jaffree,19 thus, it may be considered an authoritative approach to
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. It is commonly referred
to as the "endorsement test."
There are other principles that have been looked to by one
or more Justices in Establishment Clause cases, but they bear an
uncertain relationship to the Lemon test or the endorsement test.
14 1d. at
5

15.

See 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).

16 [d

17465 U.S. 668 (1984).
8 Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
19 See 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
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For example, government is free to accommodate religious belief
and exempt it, to an extent, from generally applicable laws. At a
certain point, however, accommodation becomes too exclusive to
21
religious institutions, 20 or too burdensome to nonreligious parties,
and is unconstitutional. Similarly, government may acknowledge
and even display religious holiday symbols, but may not
proselytize 22 or coerce 23 on behalf of religious belief. Government
may even, and perhaps must, grant equal access 24
to religious
organizations for otherwise available school resources.
History has sometimes been relied on by the Justices as an
analytical category distinct from these doctrinal formulations of
separation of church and state. Consequently, prayers opening
legislative sessions have been upheld because of their presence
throughout American history.25 Other traditional practices, such as
the national motto "In God We Trust," have been similarly
protected
as religiously insignificant forms of "ceremonial
' 26
deism.

When factors other than changes in doctrine are considered,
it is understandable that many observers regard separation of
church and state as either already invaded or threatened by recent
20

See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (striking down

tax exemption only for books teaching a faith).
21 See, e.g., Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985)

(striking down a

mandatory Sabbath work exemption).
22 See, e.g, Allegheny County v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing prohibitions on government proselytizing).
23 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down prayer at
public high school graduation).
24 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding
that a religious group could not be denied access to an otherwise available
limited public forum based on the groups religious nature).
25 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) ("In light of the
unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there can be no
doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has become
part of the fabric of our society.").
26 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Dean
Rostow).
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judicial decisions. The 2002 decision upholding the voucher
system for the Cleveland city schools, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
was a watershed case. 27 In Zelman, millions of taxpayer dollars
were being spent almost exclusively on religious schools.28
Furthermore, the fact that private religious education could have
become totally dependent on public money to survive, and that this
outcome might have had something to do with the public support
that the voucher program enjoyed, was entirely irrelevant to Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion. 29 Most important for the
outcome of the case was the consideration that the form of the
public subsidy was a payment to the parents of students rather than
to the religious schools. 30 This is an example of purely formal
neutrality that ignores the practical impact of public funds on
religious institutions. 3' The Zelman decision suggests that any
educational voucher system will be upheld and, by extension, that
any government subsidy for public services that takes the form32of a
grant to the individual can be directed to religious institutions.
In terms of passive government utilization of religious
symbols, while the Court split on displays of the Ten
Commandments in 2005, the Court upheld such a display in 2009
in PleasantGrove City, Utah v. Summum, 34 in an opinion joined by
all the Justices except David Souter. While the case was
technically about government speech rather than the Establishment
Clause, Summum strongly suggests that if the government says
little or nothing about its purposes, and includes non-religious

27 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
28 Id. at 646-48.
29
See id. at 643-63.
3

oSee id. at 653.
3' See id.
32 See generally id.

3 Cf McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (striking down
displays in County Courthouses); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)

(upholding display on the Texas State Capital grounds).
34 129 S.Ct. 1125 (2009).
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displays alongside those of a religious character, 35
it may display a
wide variety of religious symbols in public spaces.
In addition to the cases mentioned above, there have been
two "passive virtue" 36 standing cases in which Establishment
Clause merits were not reached. These cases added to the impression that the Court would not strongly enforce the separation of
church and state. In 2004, the Court "ducked," which is not too
strong a word in this instance, a well-reasoned opinion of the Ninth
Circuit that the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance
constitute "a profession of a religious belief, namely, a belief in
monotheism." 37 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit held that the
recitation of such words in a public school violates the Establishment Clause. 3 8 The Supreme Court held that the divorced father of
the student in the case lacked standing to litigate the claim.3 9 In
2007, the Court continued a trend of limiting taxpayer standing to
challenge alleged violations of the Establishment Clause by
rejecting a challenge to aspects of President George W. Bush's
faith-based initiative.40
In addition to the explicit holdings of decided cases, both
the theory of Supreme Court Justices and the composition of the
Court suggest that there will be increasing Supreme Court
toleration of religion in Establishment Clause cases. On the issue
of whether the government may promote religion, Establishment
Clause doctrine since Everson has plainly said that it may not.
Nevertheless, in a variety of cases, government has been permitted
to promote religion anyway. Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent in
McCreary County, in which he addressed this issue and was joined
by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas,
35 See generally id.
36 The phrase is associated with Professor Alexander M. Bickel's 1961 article

and denotes the positive role that avoidance of decision can play in Supreme
Court jurisprudence. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 40 (1961).
17 Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 487 (9th Cir. 2003).
38

[d.

39 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
40 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
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made perhaps the strongest argument in recent years to justify the
government's favoring of "religion over irreligion" and permit the
government's "acknowledgment of the Creator." 41 It is now quite
conceivable that the Supreme Court will permit the establishment
in America of monotheism as something like an official religion,
although Justice Scalia drew a limit at public funding of monotheistic practices.
The recent addition of new justices to the Court reinforces
the impression that monotheism may be established as an official
religion in America. While many people are offended by the notion
of handicapping the Court by counting heads, this seems a
reasonable course of action when the Court is as closely divided as
it has been in the realm of the relationship between church and
state. Justices Scalia and Thomas presumably believe that the
Constitution allows government symbolic endorsement of monotheism. Professor Gey thinks there is documentary evidence that
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito agree with
that position.42 No one can be certain whether Roberts and Alito
do, in fact, agree, but there is no reason to doubt that they do.
Justice Anthony Kennedy presents the fifth vote that would be
necessary to support the sweeping change in Establishment Clause
doctrine espoused by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Justice Kennedy
did not join the portion of Justice Scalia's dissent in McCreary
County that set forth this change, so it may be supposed that that he
does not accept it, at least not in full. Nevertheless, Justice
Kennedy has previously indicated openness to government utilization of religious symbols, most notably in his dissent from the
Court's holding in 1989 that a creche had to be removed from a
county courthouse. 43 Justice Kennedy has been notable in favoring

41See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005).

42 Gey, supra note 5, at 18.
4,County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
655-56 (1989).
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a proselytization, or coercion, analysis of the Establishment
Clause, rather than one of separation of church and state.4 4
Accordingly, when Professor Gey concludes that a new
majority on the Supreme Court is about to "abandon any pretense
of church/state separation, in favor of an approach favoring some
measure of integration of church and state," he is not engaging in
mere hyperbole. Nevertheless, Professor Gey anticipates some sort
of counter-attack in favor of the secular state in the near future.
II.

THE GROWTH OF SECULARISM

Because changes on the Supreme Court tend to lag behind
changes in the political preferences of the American people, the
current dominance on the Court of what could be called "proreligion" Justices reflects the politics of America circa 2004. The
2004 Presidential election reflected a new influence in America of
religious, or values, voters. Sixty-one percent of weekly churchgoers, who represented forty-one percent of the electorate in 2004,
voted for President Bush.45 In such a close election, this was an
enormous advantage.
The Democrats reacted to the new dominance of religious
voters by attempting to reinvent the Democratic Party as more faith
friendly. This effort included personal reinterpretations by Party
figures, which was a sort of rebranding,46 as well as successfully
running more faith-oriented candidates in the 2006 elections 47 and
44 See id. at 661 ("I doubt not, for example, that the Clause forbids a city to

permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall. This
is not because government speech about religion is per se suspect, as the
majority would have it, but because such an obtrusive year-round religious
display would place the government's weight behind an obvious effort to
proselytize on behalf of a particular religion.").
45 BRUCE LEDEWITZ, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DEMOCRACY: COMING TO TERMS

WITH THE END OF SECULAR POLITICS 3 (2007).

In January, 2005, Senator Hillary Clinton announced that she had "always
been a praying person." Michael Jonas, Sen. Clinton Urges Use of Faith-Based
Initiatives, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 2005, at B 1.
47 See LEDEWITZ, supra note 45, at 203.
46
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highlighting
religion during the 2008 Presidential Primary
4
season. 8
The impact of religious voters in 2004 was itself a part of
what appeared, at the time, to be a repudiation of the secularization
thesis. The secularization thesis is the view, either originating as a
prediction from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century,49 or
as a description of a modern world in which the thesis has come
true, 50 that religion would decline, or has declined, with the spread
of modernity. While Europe secularized during the Post-WWII
period, religion in America seemed to become more entrenched
and more significant politically. With the growth in the importance
of Islam in the world in the early twenty first century, and the
countering resurgence of world-wide Christianity, the assumptions
behind the secularization thesis have begun to be questioned. 51
However, the announcement of the death of the secularization thesis may be as premature as the announcement of the end
of religion. It now appears that, while the influence of religious
groups was growing, so too were the numbers of the nonreligious
in American society.
One early indication of the growth of secularism during the
period after the Presidential election of 2004 was the influx of
secular books. During the period from 2004 to 2007, a phenomenon emerged in America that The Atlantic Monthly would
later call "mass-market atheism." 52 Such "mass-market atheism"
began with Sam Harris in The End of Faith, published in 2004, 3

48 See Nancy Gibbs & Michael Duffy, How the Democrats Got Religion, TIME

MAGAZINE,
July 12, 2007.
49

See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION (Doubleday 1957).

50

See,

e.g.,

BRYAN

R.

WILSON,

RELIGION

IN

A SECULAR

SOCIETY:

A

SOCIOLOGIAL COMMENT (1966).
51 See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, GOD IS BACK: HOW THE
GLOBAL REVIVAL OF FAITH IS CHANGING THE WORLD

(2009).

52 Ross Douthat, Mass Market Atheism, THE ATL., July/Aug. 2008, at 79,

available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200807/atheism-douthat.
53 SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE OF
REASON

(2004).
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and continued with Daniel Dennett in Breaking the Spell54 and
Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion55 in 2006, as well as Victor
Stenger with God. The Failed Hypothesis in 2007.56 This "massmarket atheism" culminated with the best-seller blockbuster, God
is Not Great, by Christopher Hitchens, published in 2007. 57
Throughout this period, America saw the establishment of a
muscular and assertively anti-religious atheism that began to reach
a popular market. The writers mentioned above, as well as a few
others who are similarly oriented, such as Mark Lilla, author of
The Stillborn God,5 8 are often referred as the New Atheists.
Additionally, during the same period, there were particular
critiques of the influence of religion on American political life,
such as Kevin Phillips' American Theocracy, published in 2006. 59
Not all of these books were purely critical of religion.
Philip Kitcher's book, Living with Darwin, was part of this
eruption but was entirely respectful of the solace religion grants to
its participants. Nevertheless, all of these books foresaw and promoted either a less religious or non-religious future.
Of course, none of what these books had to say was exactly
new. Much of it was said by Richard Dawkins in The Blind
Watchmaker in 1986.61 Further, there is no reason to think that
secularism grew in any sudden sense. What happened is that there
54 DANIEL C.

DENNETT, BREAKING THE SPELL:

RELIGION AS A NATURAL

PHENOMENON (2006).
55RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2006).
56 VICTOR J. STENGER, GOD: THE FAILED HYPOTHESIS: How SCIENCE SHOWS
THAT GOD DOES NOT EXIST (2007).
57 CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD Is NOT GREAT: How RELIGION POISONS
EVERYTHING (2007).
58 MARK LILLA, THE STILLBORN GOD: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND THE MODERN

WEST (Alfred A. Knopf2007).
59 KEVIN PHILLIPS,

AMERICAN THEOCRACY: THE PERIL AND POLITICS OF
RADICAL RELIGION, OIL, AND BORROWED MONEY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

(Viking 2006).
60 PHILIP KITCHER, LIVING WITH DARWIN: EVOLUTION, DESIGN, AND
THE

FUTURE OF FAITH (2007).
61 RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER:

WHY THE EVIDENCE OF

EVOLUTION REVEALS A UNIVERSE WITHOUT DESIGN (1987).
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was suddenly a mass market for these books, which created the
impression that there had been a surge in secularism.
At the end of 2008, there was a strange climax to the
perception that secularism had grown. Even after President Barack
Obama's very faith-friendly Presidential campaign ended, he continued to court religious voters, including conservative religious
voters, by publicly inviting Rick Warren, the well-known
Evangelical Christian leader and author of the best-seller the
Purpose Driven Life62 to offer the invocation prayer at the presidential inauguration. Nevertheless, after extending the invitation to
Warren, President Obama seemingly changed course and electrified secularists by referring to nonbelievers in his Inauguration
Address. 63 According to USA Today, this was the first time in
American history that a 64Presidential inaugural address had
acknowledged nonbelievers.
There were good political reasons for President Obama's
reference. The PEW Forum on Religion and Public Life reported
preliminary figures that the religiously unaffiliated represented
12% of the 2008 electorate, up from 9% in 2000 and 10% in

2004.65 To appreciate the size of this number, white nonevangelical Protestants made up 19% of the electorate, as did white
Catholics.66 This is how matters stood after the 2008 Presidential
election and inauguration. Certainly, secularism was widely
regarded as having achieved something of a political breakthrough,
but its extent was unclear.

62 RICK WARREN, THE PURPOSE DRIVEN LIFE: SELECTED THOUGHTS AND

SCRIPTURES FOR THE GRADUATE (Tom Dean ed., 2004).
63 "We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus

and non-

believers." President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2009),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/.
64 See Cathy Lynn Grossman, An InauguralFirst: Obama acknowledges
'nonbelievers,' USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/
news/religion/2009-01-20-obama.non-believersN.htm.
65 Pew F. on Religion and Pub. Life website, How the Faithful Voted, Nov. 5,
2008, http://pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/How-the-Faithful-Voted.aspx.
66 1,
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Shortly thereafter, in March 2009, the American Religious
Identification Survey published results that emphasized two trends
emerging at the same time: America was growing increasingly
secular at the same time that it was growing less Christian.6 7 One
figure that may be said to have grabbed popular consciousness is
that 15% of respondents nationwide responded "none" when asked
their religion. 68 Of course, this figure is larger than the corresponding figure concerning the 1990 electorate. 69 The figure in
1990, in contrast, had been 8.2%7 °
Perhaps more significant, however, is that the number of
people calling themselves Christian fell to 76% of the population,
from 86% in 1990. This is the figure that caused Newsweek
Magazine to proclaim "The End of Christian America. ,71
There has been criticism of these findings that suggests that
they may not truly reflect what many people claim they do. This
short article is not the place to consider such critiques. The instant
point is that numbers such as these have convinced Professor Gey
that separation of church and state will make a comeback after
some period of legal decline. It is now time to analyze such a
proposition. Assuming that America has become, and is continuing
to become, more secular and less Christian, why should that lead to
more support for separation of church and state? There is a set of
assumptions behind Professor Gey's prediction, and these
assumptions are shared by both sides in Establishment Clause
debates.

67

See

BARRY A. KOSMN & ARIELA KEYSAR, TRINITY COLL., AMERICAN

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY [ARIS 2008]: SUMMARY REPORT (2009),

available at http://www.americanreligionsurvey-aris.org/reports/ARIS
2008.pdf.
68 Id. at 17.
69 Id. at "Highlights".
70

Report

[d.

71 See Jon Meacham, The End of ChristianAmerica, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4, 2009,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/ 192583.

2009-2010
III.

The New New Secularism
THE SHARED ASSUMPTIONS OF THE LAW
OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

Why would someone assume that a more secular country
would support a more stringent separation of church and state?
After all, demographic change would not necessarily lead to
change in other areas of constitutional law. A surge in older people
would not greatly change the law of search and seizure. The
existence of more women would be unlikely to have much impact
on the law of free speech.
The assumptions operative in the law of church and state
are that most, if not all, secularists support the strict separation of
church and state. Further, it is assumed that many believers in
minority religions likewise support the strict separation of church
and state, although they do so out of a desire to protect themselves
against the religious majority. On the other hand, it is assumed that
many Christians, although not all, support a mixing of church and
state, and that some believers in minority monotheisms, such as
Jews and Muslims, similarly support such a mixing. In this
framework of opposing forces, there can only be a winning side
and a losing side. Compromise is impossible.
Other areas of constitutional law are not approached with
the spirit of competition that is engendered by the Establishment
Clause. Of course, in every legal case there are at least two
opposing sides. However, I am referring here not to particular
opposing parties in cases, but to overall competing visions of
national life. Although Americans frequently disagree about the
law of search and seizure (for example, whether and what kind of
exclusionary rule to have), there is generally consensus about the
desirability of a private space beyond the reach of the police.
Similarly, Americans share the assumption about freedom of
speech that, most of the time, people should be free to say what
they like. Even in the realm of abortion, a very divisive and
politicized legal context, there is talk today about finding
"common ground." There is very little talk in terms of the
Establishment Clause.
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The two sides in the controversy over separation of church
and state understand the oppositional nature of this national dispute
over the place of religion in the public square. On the pro-religion
side, Justice Scalia has put the contested nature of the matter most
starkly:
[I]n the context of public acknowledgments of God there
are legitimate competing interests: On the one hand, the
interest of that minority in not feeling "excluded"; but on
the other, the interest of the overwhelming majority of
religious believers in being able to give God thanks and
supplication as a people, and with respect to our national
endeavors. Our national72tradition has resolved that conflict
in favor of the majority.
From the perspective of those persons wanting to worship
as a people, there is no alternative to public worship. On the
opposite side, for those who want a secular public space in which
religious worship is a private choice, there is no alternative to
attempting to prevent public worship. As a result, there is currently
a lawsuit which attempts to enjoin President Obama's recent
proclamation of a national day of prayer, 73 even though the Day of
Prayer is purely symbolic. There is no place for compromise when
there is such disagreement over competing visions of national life.
In response to Justice Scalia's tendentious invocation of a
history that is much too contentious to be said fairly to "resolve"
anything in the realm of separation of church and state, a secularist
may assert: "Yes, throughout our history, you have imposed your
religious practices on the minority because you had overwhelmingly large numbers. But in the future that will change." Such a
secular attitude is why one might assume that a more secular and
72 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting).
73 Ryan Foley, National Day of Prayer: Obama Scales Back From Bush,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 6, 2009, available at http://www.cnsnews.com/
news/article/64581.
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less Christian future will usher in a renewed commitment to
separation of church and state.
The pro-separation side of this dispute sometimes denies
that there will be winners and losers if they prevail. Such a position
was expressed by Justice Souter in Lee v. Weisman,74 a case in
which the Court enjoined nonsectarian prayer at a public high
school graduation:
Religious students cannot complain that omitting prayers
from their graduation ceremony would, in any realistic
sense, "burden" their spiritual callings. To be sure, many of
them invest this rite of passage with spiritual significance,
but they may express their religious feelings about it before
and after the ceremony. They may even organize a privately sponsored baccalaureate if they desire the company of
likeminded students. Because they accordingly have no
need for the machinery of the State to affirm their beliefs,
the government's sponsorship of prayer at the graduation
ceremony is most reasonably understood as an official
endorsement of religion and, in this instance, of theistic
religion. One may fairly say, as one commentator has
suggested, that the government brought prayer into the
ceremony "precisely because some people want a symbolic
affirmation that government approves and endorses their
religion, and because many of the people who want this
affirmation ' 75
place little or no value on the costs to religious
minorities.
Justice Souter's rather mean-spirited criticism of those who
press for public worship simply ignores the dilemma that Justice
Scalia identified. The believer wants public worship not to express
government approval, or an endorsement, of his or her religion.
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
71Id. at 629-30 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Douglas Laycock, Summary
and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 841, 844
(1992)).
74
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The believer wants God to bless the community as a whole and,
therefore, seeks a communal act of worship. Most believers would
not dream of coercing anyone to participate in public prayer, at
least not to more of an extent than mere presence by nonbelievers
at a ceremony where prayers are offered might be said to coerce. In
the context of public prayer, there are deeply-held values on both
sides that are in a current, irreconcilable conflict. Justice Souter
can only claim that the other side loses nothing if such public
prayer is prevented by the courts because he refuses to fully
acknowledge the depth of the believer's position.
The pro-separation side occasionally also claims that it is
only the government's involvement with religion that causes
division. This specter of inter-religious conflict was invoked by
Justice Stephen Breyer in his dissent in the Cleveland school
voucher case.76

However, recent history shows that religious communities
in America cooperate quite fully with each other. The controversy
over school vouchers is a good example. That dispute has not
pitted Protestants against Catholics, as it might have in the past,
even though almost all of the public money will end up going to
Catholic schools. Instead, the dispute has centered around
separation of church and state. In other words, the divisiveness
arises from the clash of separation versus nonseparation, not from
intra-religious disputes. It is not convincing to claim, as Justice
Breyer does, that declaring one side in a dispute to be the winner is
the proper way to end division.
Consequently, in calling these assumptions of conflict
"shared" assumptions, I am attributing to the secular side a
position that it does not always acknowledge. If that seems unfair
to the secular side, the claim can be put less controversially.
Professor Gey assumes that, in the future, a newly empowered and
enlarged secular community will join with certain majority and
minority believers to push for a strict interpretation of separation of
church and state. Gey further assumes that the remaining
76

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

2009-2010

The New New Secularism

monotheist majority will resist that attempt. This opposition
between secularists and minority believers on the one hand, and
the majority believers on the other, has been at the heart of the law
of church and state throughout the postwar era. It is this opposition
that may be thrown into question in the future by changes that are
occurring today in secularism.
IV.

THE NEW NEW SECULARISM

Peter Steinfels, a professor at Fordham University and codirector of the Fordham Center on Religion and Culture, writes
biweekly columns, called Beliefs, for the New York Times. In a
February, 2009 column, Steinfels pointed to "something more"
than the New Atheism that I alluded to above. 77 If the "New
Atheists" are "polemicists who set out to counter in-your-facereligion with in-your-face atheism," 78 wrote Steifels, Ronald
Aronson and Andr679Comte-Sponville are perhaps examples of a
"new new atheism."
What sets the two groups apart is that the project of the new
new atheists is not to reject religion. Presumably, that has already
been accomplished by the growth in secularism. Instead, the
mission of the new new athiests is to present "a coherent popular
philosophy that answers vital questions about how to live one's
life"80 without God. Nonbelief today is thin and empty. Living
without God, the title82 of Aronson's recent book, 81 "'means turning
toward something."'

77 Peter Steinfels, The New Atheism, and Something More, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2009, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/14/us/14beliefs.

html? r-2.
78
79

id.
id.

' 0 Id. (quoting Ronald Aronson).

81 RONALD ARONSON, LIVING WITHOUT GOD: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR ATHEISTS,
AGNOSTICS, SECULARISTS, AND THE UNDECIDED (2008).

12 Steinfels, supra note 77 (quoting Ronald Aronson).
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Aronson's substitute for religion may sound predictable: he
stresses a commitment to an interdependent humankind.8 3

But

Aronson adds "gratitude" to his recipe for secular life: "Giving
thanks... has been central to religion, and secular culture needs to
be enriched with an equivalent."8 4 This attitude is certainly not a

predictable secular one.
The other new new athiest identified by Stienfels, ComteSponville, author of The Little Book of Atheist Spirituality,85 came
to his atheism through spiritual experiences similar to those that
have led many believers into close connection with God. 86 In The
Little Book of Athiest Spirituality, Comte-Sponville describes an
experience of interconnection with all reality, that is common in
religious literature and is sometimes referred to as the oceanic
feeling.87 However,
for Comte-Sponville, the experience led away
88
theism.
from
What should be noted about Aronson and Comte-Sponville
is that neither of the two philosophers opposes religion; they are
simply not believers and both utilize their religious training and
experience to enrich their atheism. Comte-Sponville even doubts
that whole societies can flourish without religious belief.
Aronson and Comte-Sponville may be said to be part of a
loose movement of nonbelievers whose main focus is on
secularism itself, as well as its capacity to flourish in the future,
rather than on the shortcomings of religion. Some of the other
writers involved in this movement are anti-religion, while others
are not. However, all of them are concerned with how to live a
nonbelieving life well.
Before discussing some of these other nonbelievers, it is
necessary to note a distinction in terminology. Steinfels calls

" See id.
84

id.

8' ANDRE COMTE-SPONVILLE, THE LITTLE BOOK OF ATHEIST SPIRITUALITY

(Nancy Huston trans., 2007).
86 See Steinfels, supra note
77.
87

See

8

See Steinfels, supra note 77.

COMTE-SPONVILLE,

supranote 85.
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thinkers like these the new new atheists, whereas I refer to them as
the new new secularists. The reason for the change is that, while
Aronson and Comte-Sponville eschew the word God, not all of the
new new secularists do. Non-theistic use of the word God is not a
new phenomenon. In an earlier time, John Dewey exasperated
some by refusing to abandon the word God when he abandoned
Christian dogma. In Dewey's view, "[u]se of the words 'God' or
'divine' to convey the union of actual with ideal may protect man
from a sense of isolation and from consequent despair or
defiance." 89 Indeed, there are religious thinkers within the JudeoChristian tradition who reject the personal Creator God of some
versions of biblical religion that the new new secularists reject.90
The use of the word God is a fraught and important issue that is
beyond the scope of this article. I use the terminology "new new
secularists," rather than "new new athiests," because some
individuals in the movement use the term God.
There are a number of thinkers who can properly be
considered to be new new secularists. However, two classes of new
new secularists are especially important: the scientists and the
political theorists. The former are important because science is
often portrayed as antithetical to religion. The latter are important
because the secular/religious divide is of intense political
significance in the United States.
One scientist who is a new new secularist is Stuart
Kauffman, the founding director of the Institute for Biocomplexity
and Informatics and the author of Reinventing the Sacred.9'
Kauffman is a biologist and researcher who focuses on the study of
complex systems. On strictly scientific and naturalistic grounds,
Kauffman rejects a strictly materialist account of reality, which is a
reductionist school of thought that attempts to understand the
natural world solely through physics. Kauffman views organisms,
89

JOHiN DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH 53 (1934).
90 See, e.g., MICHAEL HAMPSON, GOD WITHOUT GOD: WESTERN SPIRITUALITY
WITHOUT THE WRATHFUL KING (2008).
91 STUART A. KAUFFMAN, REINVENTING
SCIENCE, REASON, AND RELIGION

(2008).
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including human beings and all their acts and values, as "real
entities in the universe," 92 rather than viewing values and the
context of meaning as merely mental constructs.
According to Kauffman, the creative capacity of the
universe cannot be explained completely by the unfolding of
invariant natural laws, but rests in indeterminacy. The very quality
of the universe that frightened Einstein, that God might be playing
dice with the universe, 93 exhilarates Kauffman. Kauffman writes
that the capacity of the universe to create without fixed rules "is so
stunning, so overwhelming, so worthy of awe, gratitude, and
respect that it is God enough for many of 94us. God, a fully natural
God, is the very creativity in the universe."
Kauffman believes that this way of thinking about and
experiencing reality holds the promise of a new human solidarity:
If we are member of a universe in which emergence and
ceaseless creativity abound, if we take that creativity as a
sense of God we can share, the resulting sense of the
sacredness of all of life and the planet can help orient our
lives beyond the consumerism and commodification the
industrialized world now lives, heal the split between
reason and faith, heal the split between science and the
humanities, heal the want of spirituality, heal the wound
derived from the false reductionist belief that we live in a
world of fact without values, and help us jointly build a
global ethic.95
Kauffman is not alone in seeing a kind of transcendence in
reality without any suggestion of the supernatural. The British
paleontologist Simon Conway Morris would certainly agree with
Kauffman that reality is not reducible to physics and materialism;
that is to say, reality is not reducible to particles and forces.
92

Id. at 3.

93 See WALTER ISAACSON, EINSTEIN:

94 Kauffman, supra note 9 1, at 6.
95

Id. at 9.

His LIFE AND UNIVERSE 335 (2007).
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However, whereas Kauffman emphasizes there being surprise at
the heart of reality, Conway Morris sees a kind of ultimate
inevitability, although with plenty of creative and unpredictable
processes mixed in.96 In Life's Solution, Conway Morris argues
that there is a strangeness and mystery in the universe. 97 An
example of such mystery is evolutionary convergence, in which the
98
same kinds of appropriate solutions emerge in different contexts.
As a result, human beings may witness similarity and familiarity
wherever in the universe life has emerged. 99 The other great
mystery identified by Conway Morris is "how it might be that we,
a product of evolution, possess an overwhelming sense of purpose
and moral identity yet arose by processes that were seemingly
without meaning. ' 1°° These two mysteries are related. The first
mystery, evolutionary convergence, suggests that the second
mystery, purpose, did not emerge by accident, but was inevitable
within evolutionary development. Conway Morris concludes that
"the universe [is] strangely fit to purpose .... ,101 The non-scientist
religious believer might say that God "put" these potentials, or
inherencies, into matter. However, I conclude, instead, that the
word God is what humans say when we refer to these potentials for
consciousness and purpose as, in fact, built into matter.
On the political side of the new new secularism, Austin
Dacey's book, The Secular Conscience: Why Belief Belongs in
Public Life, 10 2 was shocking to many when it was published in
2008. I regard Dacey as a fully-committed atheist, and even a critic
of religion, because of his association with the Center for Inquiry,
which is an organization that debunks paranormal claims and
defends evidence-based inquiry into all aspects of the human
96 See SIMON CONWAY MORRIS, LIFE'S SOLUTION: INEVITABLE HUMANS IN A
LONELY UNIVERSE 194, 328 (2003).

97 See id.
9' See

id. at xii.

99 See id.

100 Id. at 2.

101Id. at 327.
102 AUSTIN DACEY,
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condition. Therefore, when Dacey accuses secularism as having
"lost its soul" in moral relativism, it is clear that fundamental
10 3
changes are taking place in secularism's self-understanding.
Dacey maintains not only that values are not private, but that,
ultimately, they are not subjective. 104 There is a sense in which
values are true or untrue.10 5 Thus, when we say something like "the
holocaust was wrong," we are asserting a kind of moral fact that
may be evaluated objectively. Further, Dacey clearly shares the
view of Martin Luther King, Jr. that there is moral arc in the
universe, although he does not literally say this.10 6 Examples that
Dacey presents to his readers, such as the long-term developing
recognition of the rights of women and the rights of animals, are
clearly meant to illustrate a one-way process of moral
development. 10 7 In his work, Dacey neatly turns a claim associated
with Richard Rorty against itself by attributing conversationstopping not to religion,
but to the unwillingness of secularists to
108
claims.
moral
debate
The objectivity of values is, as Dacey notes, not a uniquely
religious position. However, for C.S. Lewis, the theory of objective
value, which is "the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and
others really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the kind
of things we are,"' 0 9 serves as the ground of all religion and,
indeed, of all classic philosophy. If secularism were to adopt this
kind of objective comportment toward reality, it would, according
to Lewis, share many common features with our religious
traditions.
Dacey himself is an ardent critic of religion and a defender
of separation of church and state. I do not mean to suggest
103See

id. at 23-42.

See id. at 133-40.
105See id.
'06 See generally id.
107See, e.g., id. at 253 n.18.
104

1°'
Id. at 14-15.

109C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN; OR, REFLECTIONS ON EDUCATION WITH

SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH IN THE UPPER FORMS OF

SCHOOLS 12 (1947).
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otherwise. My point here is that secularism may be developing
toward new formulations of starting points and assumptions that it
shares with religious worldviews. In the next section, I will
consider what the implications of such a shift in secularist thinking
might be for interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
In the realms where secularism and religion most obviously
overlap, such as philosophy and ethics, widely defined, there are
many examples of recent thinking that could unite believers and
nonbelievers. Chet Raymo is an example of a thoroughly religious
naturalist. His recent book, When God is Gone, Everything is
Holy,110 is a description of how to live "religiously" without God.
Susan Neiman's recent book, Moral Clarity,"1 describes how to
live ethically without God. An earlier work by James C. Edwards,
The Plain Sense of Things, 12 suggests how to live poetically and
philosophically without God. All of these works can be read by
believers and nonbelievers to similar effect: how to live in moral
depth whether God exists or not. These books, as well as others
addressing the same topic, demonstrate that some forms of
secularism and religious traditions have become similar to each
other in recent years.
Why is this ferment occurring in secularism? The reason
may be the growth of secularism. It is now conceivable that, by the
end of this century, most Americans will not be Christians, or even
believers. It thus becomes necessary to ask how such a culture can
sustain meaningful human life.
We now arrive at the final and, for our purposes, most
important question. If secularism has changed, or is changing, in
ways that bring it into a closer relationship with traditionally
religious concerns and perspectives, what, if anything, does that
suggest for the law of separation of church and state? In the final
110 CHET
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section, I suggest that such developments in secularism will bring
an end to the separation of church and state. Ultimately, the law of
separation of church and state will be replaced by the law of public
expression of shared meaning.
V.

THE END OF THE LAW OF SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE
BEGINNING OF THE LAW OF PUBLIC
EXPRESSION OF SHARED MEANING

The assumptions of the law of separation of church and
state are that the public square, as well as public policy generally,
will either contain religious elements or will be secular. This
thinking parallels that regarding public subsidies and access to
public resources - that religious institutions either will benefit
from such resources or they will not and that the distinction
between religious and nonreligious institutions will be self-evident.
Some religious believers are assumed to want a more religious
public square, while most secularists are assumed to oppose that.
The new new secular thinking of the kind described in the
previous section undermines the current law of separation of
church and state because it mixes traditional religious categories
with secular categories. The changes that are promoted by new
new secular thinking can be illustrated by four examples: the
public use of the word God, the public endorsement of objective
values, the distribution of public subsidies to religiously-oriented
institutions and the resistance to nihilism in public schools.
The challenge to the use of the word God in the Pledge of
Allegiance is straightforward in its application of the law of church
and state. As the Ninth Circuit maintained, "under God" expresses
government endorsement of a belief in monotheism. 1 13 Many
religious believers support this reference to God as a form of
public worship, while many secularists oppose it. Eventually, as

113See

Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466 (2003).
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secularism grows in influence, the words "under God" may be
removed.
However, if God were reconceived by secularism as a
"symbol of something true," as envisioned by Jack Call, another of
the new new secularists, 114 then "under God" might express a view
of human experience that many secularists would share. An
example of such a view would be the position that reality is
creative and beneficent. In such a situation, the Pledge of
Allegiance would endorse biblical religion in the minds of some.
However, at the same time, the Pledge would endorse a worldview
shared by both believers and nonbelievers.
Without trying to determine all of the instances when
government might be permitted to use God language, under the
Establishment Clause, I suggest that under such a reformulation,
government use of religious imagery would no longer pertain to
church and state as such, but to public expression of shared
meaning. The government would be using the word God to express
a controversial view of reality, such as the objectivity of values,
but one that is not itself religious. The controversial nature of such
a claim would not render the claim unconstitutional. One important
aspect of the law of public expression of shared meaning, which is
already enshrined in the doctrine of government speech, is that the
government may endorse messages that are not universally
accepted. Materialists, humanists, relativists and nihilists have
never been viewed as having the right to prevent government
endorsements of a worldview they oppose. Therefore, the
government might be permitted to use the word God to express a
non-religious, yet still controversial, view of reality, whether it be
Kauffman's view or some related government message. This use of
the word God would not be mere ceremonial deism or vague civil
religion. It would be a commitment to a particular way of
encountering the world.

114 JACK CALL, GOD IS A SYMBOL OF SOMETHING TRUE: WHY
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The same can be said of government endorsement of
objective values. Professor Gey expressly associates separation of
church and state with "modernist" skepticism against "collective
determinations of ultimate truths." '' 5 However, even assuming that
such collective judgments are not made now, which is a dubious
assumption, secular critics such as Austin Dacey want to challenge
116
such relativism in the name of a newly resurgent secularism.
Dacey wants to return us to the view that human rights are rooted
in objective truth. 1 7 Strictly speaking, such rights are not subject
to collective determination, and they are certainly beyond
individual choice. Ontologically speaking, rights are real, in other
words.
Dacey recapitulates the Declaration of Independence's
commitment that we are endowed by our Creator with certain
unalienable rights. This is a political, not a theological, claim. This
claim is not about the nature of the Creator, but about the nature of
rights. The Declaration affirmed that human rights are not gifts
from the government.
The public display of the Ten Commandments is one way
of endorsing this view of objective values. It must be admitted that
religious believers today, as well as most people in the Eighteenth
Century, thought that the revelation of the law from God is what
gives the law its supra-human quality. Obviously, Dacey would
deny that. However, not only Dacey, but the entire tradition of
universal human rights, assumes that the foundation of human
rights goes beyond majority or individual will. So long as this
message can be gleaned from a display of the Ten Commandments, such a display would be a perfectly acceptable symbol
through which to express it. Again, the point would be political that is, about the nature of rights - instead of theological. Earlier
generations understood the reality of rights in religious terms.
Many people still do. But the government's utilization of the Ten
115 Gey,

supra note 5, at 32-35.
116 See DACEY, supra note 102.
117

See generally id.

2009-2010

The New New Secularism

Commandments endorses only the political truth of the objectivity
and universality of human rights.
Public vouchers for private schools can be understood in a
similar manner. Today, almost all voucher money goes to private
religious schools, usually Catholic schools. This is opposed by
many secularists as a violation of the separation of church and
state. Such vouchers will function differently in the future, when
secularists have built shared ethical ground with religious
believers. In that future, some vouchers will be redeemed at
secular, but meaning-filled, educational institutions. And, in such a
future, even where vouchers are used in traditionally religious
schools, some secularists will prefer that school students absorb
objective values from somewhere, even if it is a Catholic school,
rather than be captured by relativism. Even ardent secularists may
come to accept vouchers on that basis.
Finally, even the fight over evolutionary theory in the
public schools might change its terms when looked at through the
lens of someone like Conway Morris, who sees purpose and
meaning as part of evolutionary development. Of course, Conway
Morris opposes teaching creationism or intelligent design on the
grounds that it is bad science. 118 Nevertheless, he appreciates, in a
way that many secularists do not, that the apparent meaninglessness of the processes of evolution might undermine cultural
morale.1 19 It is not wrong for parents to fear that ninth grade
biology class might, sub silentio, endorse a kind of nihilism and
that this might negatively affect young people. The point of
Conway Morris' work is to combat just that implication of the
purposelessness of life. Instead of insisting on bad science, school
boards could assign his book, Life's Solution, along with teaching
the theory of evolution.
If a school board were to teach such a variety of
viewpoints, and were to do so expressly in order to combat the
specter of nihilism, there should not be a question of separation of
118 See CONWAY, supra note 96, at 4-5.

119 See generally id. at 311-30.
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church and state. This is a good illustration that a new new
secularism would end the current law of church and state and
substitute the law of public expression of shared meaning.
CONCLUSION
Is all this actually going to happen? It might not.
Secularism might cease growing. Alternatively, it might remain
inflexibly anti-religion. It is also possible that religion itself would
be strengthened and renewed. I am not so much concerned here
with prediction as with possibility.
It is clear that the Supreme Court is not going to enforce a
strict separation of church and state in the near future. There may
even be radical new doctrinal formulations that allow greater
religious influence in the public square.
It is also likely that a growing secularism will eventually
halt, if not reverse, this trend. The question is what will happen at
that point. Many secular thinkers hope for and expect the
resurgence of a truly secular state.
Instead, what I expect and hope for is a new appreciation of
traditionally religious questions, and even aspects of traditional
religious responses, on the part of a secularism now responsible,
for the first time, for sustaining a flourishing community. Such a
secularism may come to appreciate seeming endorsements of
religion in the public square, not for the fact that they endorse
religion, but because they express meaning.

